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Abstract
This commentary was originally published in CIDRAP News and it is here reported almost
verbatim to allow divulgation through open access. The Editorial summarizes John Barry's concerns
about the value of accurate historical reporting and its implications in public policy determination.
This short abstract was written by the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Translational Medicine to
introduce the Editorial.
Editorial
Remarks from CIDRAP Director Michael T. Osterholm, 
PhD, MPH
John M. Barry is one of our nation's most respected histo-
rians, and his chronicle of the 1918 pandemic, The Great
Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History, is
regarded by many influenza and public health experts as
the definitive historical review of that event [1,2]. To par-
aphrase the old E.F. Hutton commercial, "When Barry
speaks, most of us concerned about our preparedness for
the next pandemic listen." You will find below a commen-
tary from Barry dealing with the important question of the
use of nonpharmaceutical measures during the 1918 pan-
demic.
As any reader of this Web site knows, CIDRAP has made
pandemic influenza preparedness one of its highest prior-
ities as an infectious disease research and policy organiza-
tion. I believe the next influenza pandemic, if even
moderate in nature, will be one of the most catastrophic
public health events in history. I come to this conclusion
because of the size of the world's population today
(approximately 6.5 billion, compared with 1.2 billion in
1918), the likelihood that there will be a lack of stock-
piled and effective pandemic vaccine at outset of the pan-
demic, and the existence of the global just-in-time
economy, which means we will soon exhaust many criti-
cal products and services, like drugs and vaccines, other
medical supplies, and even food, in the early days of the
pandemic.
Frankly, our one real hope is that all the other public
health tools we have employed in past infectious disease
epidemics will make a difference. These tools have largely
tried to change individual and community-based behav-
ior to avoid exposure to the infectious agent until after the
epidemic has run its course. These are often referred to as
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and include
familiar approaches such as isolation, quarantine, and
social distancing. While all of us might believe that these
measures will work, until recently very little evidence has
been available concerning their efficacy in reducing either
morbidity or mortality in an influenza pandemic. This is
due in part to the infrequency of such pandemics (three in
the last century) and an absence of systematic studies dur-
ing those pandemics of our collective public health
actions and their impact.
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sity of Michigan and colleagues published a study of the
public health actions taken in 43 cities during the 1918–
19 pandemic and the associated morbidity and mortality
in those cites [3]. They concluded that when NPI strategies
were employed, they made a difference. This was a very
important conclusion, as the results of the Markel study
now serve as the core support for the recent Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention recommendations for the
use of community mitigation strategies (ie, NPIs) during
a pandemic [4].
Since publication of his book in 2004, Barry has been
involved in the preparedness effort and continued to do
research on NPIs. Most of this work has expanded on find-
ings in the book, and some of it has caused him to revise
views expressed there. Since the Markel publication in
JAMA, Barry has raised serious challenges to the data used
by Markel's group to justify their conclusions about the
public health actions they reported to have been taken in
2 of the 43 cities (New York City and Chicago). These are
the only two cities among the 43 for which Barry did such
follow-up research. Barry wrote what I believe to be a con-
vincing and well-supported letter to JAMA with his con-
cerns. Last week his letter [5] and Markel's response were
published in JAMA [6].
In the letters, Barry debated with Markel and colleagues
whether New York City authorities ever used isolation and
quarantine to combat the influenza pandemic in the fall
of 1918.
Barry acknowledged that City Health Commissioner
Royal Copeland told reporters in September 1918 that he
would use isolation and quarantine. However, he cited a
pair of articles published in an October 1918 issue of the
New York Medical Journal by Copeland and his assistant as
evidence that these measures were never used. Both arti-
cles reported on the epidemic and the city's response, but
neither mentioned isolation, quarantine, or other major
NPIs. Further, the city health department's annual report
mentioned no NPIs used in the flu epidemic, according to
Barry.
In response, Markel and his colleagues cited news reports
from the New York Times and JAMA as evidence that the
city did use isolation and quarantine. A story in the Times
for Sep 19, 1918, said three New Yorkers had been quar-
antined the day before, and in a Nov 17 story, Copeland
was quoted as saying the city had quarantined arriving
ship passengers. In addition, a story in the Sep 28 JAMA
said flu patients were "quarantined," according to Markel
et al. They also noted that Barry cited the JAMA story in his
own book as evidence of a New York City quarantine.
I believe Markel and colleagues did not address the impor-
tant challenges that Barry presented. In my view, his infor-
mation raises serious challenges to the scientific integrity
of what Markel and colleagues have reported for two cites
included in their study, which in turn raises important
questions about the overall results of their study. This con-
cern does not disprove that NPIs altered the course of the
pandemic. But we in public health will face overwhelming
challenges with risk communication and credibility dur-
ing the next pandemic. While we will surely recommend
the use of NPIs at that time, we have an obligation to soci-
ety to tell exactly what we know and explain the science
that supports our conclusions. How will we ever be able
to dismiss and even condemn the crazy things that some
will try to do during a pandemic if we don't base recom-
mendations on the strength of our science? We must hold
ourselves to that standard now and in the future. I believe
John Barry makes a clear and compelling case below that
Markel has not met that standard. We must.
Commentary by John M. Barry
Policy makers are today considering implementing nonp-
harmaceutical interventions in the face of a pandemic on
the basis of analyses of their historic use in 1918. I support
many (though not all) of the proposed interventions, but
I do not support analysis based on weak data – especially
when those data are flatly contradicted by better informa-
tion. Yet that is what could happen in this case. And
although my letter to JAMA [5] was limited to New York
City, the mistaken data in the article by Markel et al
[3]seem to extend at least to Chicago as well.
It is not difficult to establish the facts, but Markel in his
reply to my letter to JAMA [6] manages to obscure them.
He cites two sources in addition to the New York Times to
support his claim that New York City imposed a quaran-
tine. These other sources are a 1918 JAMA article and my
own book. Yet in actuality these other citations, as well as
the New York Times itself, all circle back to a single person
– Royal Copeland, head of the city's health department –
and what he told the Times. Everything the newspaper
reported about quarantine, including Markel's claim that
the "next day, 3 New Yorkers were quarantined," came
from a direct quote by Copeland; the newspaper did no
independent reporting whatsoever, nor did it quote any
other health department or city official, or anyone else, in
these stories on quarantine. (More about Copeland later.)
The 1918 JAMA citation is not a peer-reviewed article; it is
a news item based on Copeland's published comments.
Markel also cited my book. In my book research, I read the
same New York Times and JAMA articles that he did, and I
initially believed them, as he still does. Hence my book
incorrectly stated that New York imposed a quarantine.
However, I gave the public health response in New YorkPage 2 of 5
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my focus, and all my digging into primary sources and
archival material, lay elsewhere. After my book was pub-
lished, and as I got involved with the pandemic prepared-
ness effort, the fact that New York City had a relatively
benign experience continued to intrigue me. Since New
York City did not close schools, I became increasingly
curious if its quarantine could have accounted for its expe-
rience. So I investigated. New data convinced me that
there was no quarantine, and I reversed my position. The
footnotes and bibliography to his original article suggest
that Markel never learned of these data, some of which are
detailed below.
Here are the undisputed facts:
Records don't mention quarantine
Markel makes much of the city Board of Health's vote to
make influenza a reportable disease on Sep 17. The board
did make this decision, but this does not support his argu-
ment. Making a disease reportable does absolutely noth-
ing in itself to control that disease. Neither the minutes of
the Sep 17 board meeting nor the minutes of other board
meetings throughout the pandemic mention quarantine,
although they do include discussion of less severe NPIs
that were employed. This is a strange omission if quaran-
tine was actually used. Nor do any other department
records contain any evidence that the city imposed quar-
antine. Had there been a quarantine, one would have
expected details about how many inspectors were
involved, the number of homes visited, the period of
quarantine, placards put up, etc. Health departments in
cities that did impose quarantine recorded all these data.
Yet no such data exist for New York City. Quarantine was
not mentioned in the weekly, monthly, or annual reports
of the heath department, even though these reports were
so detailed that, as I pointed out in my original letter, they
recounted how many laboratory flasks were washed.
The two articles in the New York Medical Journal – they
were reprints of speeches, as Markel says – are primary
sources; they are contemporaneous reports to physicians
gathered to discuss the outbreak by Copeland and his
deputy Louis Harris, head of the department's Bureau of
Preventable Disease. Harris gave the presentation
reprinted under the title "Epidemiology and Administra-
tive Control of Influenza," which is one of the items miss-
ing from Markel's bibliography. His unfamiliarity with
this source is a serious lapse, since the report explicitly
addresses what we now call NPIs in New York City and
was authored by the person in charge of those interven-
tions, including all department quarantines. Both men
recite a long list of actions taken, beginning with some
attempt during the summer to monitor a few individual
case-patients coming off ships.
For the sake of argument, let's say Markel is correct and
this summer effort was more robust than I think. That still
has nothing to do with what happened during the out-
break itself. It's one thing to surveil three or four people
coming off a ship, especially since no effort was made to
monitor any asymptomatic individuals, a failure which
rather undermines any attempt to control disease such as
influenza. It's another to wait for a case to be reported
(and hope cases are in fact being reported) and then try to
isolate dozens, then quickly hundreds, then thousands of
influenza cases. No wonder Copeland debunked the idea,
as he did in the quotation used in my letter to JAMA. Mar-
kel accuses me of taking this quote out of context. Rather
than argue with him, I will happily fax the articles to any-
one who requests them (print quality of the articles pre-
vents including a link here) so readers can judge for
themselves.
According to the New York Medical Journal articles, as the
pandemic began and after making the disease reportable,
the health department launched a series of initiatives.
Harris lists them, and they include but are not limited to
public education efforts (which proved disappointing to
both Copeland and Harris), enforcement of antispitting
ordinances, an attempt to stagger business closings to
limit rush-hour crowds, closing of selected unsanitary
theaters, and the like. These articles also justified the deci-
sions to keep schools open and not to ban public gather-
ings, as most other cities did. (School closings, bans on
public gatherings, and quarantine were the three chief
NPIs Markel tracked.) Neither Copeland nor Harris cites
quarantine or isolation as an action taken during the out-
break itself. Harris was explicitly detailing "administra-
tive" public health initiatives to "control" influenza. He
was the individual in charge of quarantine. He made no
mention of quarantine. Is it plausible, or even conceiva-
ble, that he would have made no mention of quarantine
if quarantine had actually been imposed?
Health commissioner's veracity in doubt
Now let's consider Markel's sole source on quarantine:
Royal Copeland, who told the New York Times that the city
was imposing it. The newspaper no doubt quoted Cope-
land accurately. But who was Copeland? He was a home-
opath, not a medical doctor, who said, "Man is a social
animal.... Organization is a necessity and my organization
is Tammany." Tammany, the most corrupt political
machine in American history, had been out of power for
several years but regained control of New York City in
early 1918. It promptly began putting loyalists into every
available patronage job, and it tried to force qualified civil
servants out of jobs that were not strictly patronage. For
the health department, Tammany initially chose as direc-
tor someone whom it regarded as a loyalist but not Cope-
land. But as Tammany moved with increasingPage 3 of 5
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officials with unqualified cronies, after a few months on
the job, Tammany's choice for director of the health
department quit in protest. When no MD surfaced for the
job, Tammany turned to Copeland, not an MD but a true
Tammany man.
Why would Copeland lie about the use of quarantine?
There were specific reasons in this case, beyond just trying
to make himself appear in command. The same day that
New York made influenza reportable, Jersey City imposed
an actual quarantine. The Times reported both actions. It
is easy to imagine that this put pressure on Copeland. At
any rate, the same day the information about Jersey City
was published, he told the Times that New York City was
using "strict isolation and quarantine," in effect calling
Jersey City on quarantine and raising it on "strict isola-
tion."
The larger context makes lying more understandable as
well. The United States was at war. Every piece of govern-
ment-released public information – federal, state, and
local – was considered from the perspective of how to
keep up morale. The official position of the US govern-
ment's Committee on Public Information was: "The force
of an idea lies in its inspirational value. It matters very lit-
tle if it is true or false." (Indeed, the pandemic became
known as "Spanish influenza" because in all the warring
countries, newspapers, which were either censored or
intimidated, initially did not report on the disease. Spain
was not at war, and its newspapers headlined it. Hence,
even though we know the disease appeared in France, Ger-
many, Britain, and the United States before Spain, Spain
gave the pandemic its name). Also to maintain morale
during the pandemic, national public health officials –
people who knew the truth – said, "This is ordinary influ-
enza by another name," and, "You have nothing to fear if
proper precautions are taken," and, "This is nothing more
than ordinary lagrippe or influenza." Local public health
officials all over the country echoed that line.
Copeland and Harris did not, however, lie in the medical
journal articles quoted above, which were, as Markel
notes, reprints of speeches they made to a meeting of New
York City physicians desperate to find ways to alleviate the
most lethal disease outbreak in their lives. Copeland
would have been scorned out of the room if he had told
such lies at such a meeting, to an audience who knew the
truth. Therefore they made no mention of quarantine as
an action taken during the pandemic.
Chicago's actions came late
Now to Chicago, which also had a relatively benign expe-
rience in the pandemic. According to Markel et al, Chicago
tied for the third earliest intervention of the 43 cities he
studied, acting on day minus-2, ie, 2 days before the mor-
tality rate exceeded double the baseline rate. We do not
know what action Chicago took that day, because the
Markel article does not identify any action in any city on
any date, nor does it provide any documentation for any
of these specific actions. Markel does offer a 1,144-item
online bibliography, but the size obscures rather than elu-
cidates, since readers have no way of matching documen-
tation with any particular action.
The article does explain that it uses only three major
actions – quarantine, school closings, and general bans on
public gatherings – as metrics for NPIs, so Chicago's
action should have been one of those three. But according
to the Chicago health department's 100-plus-page
"Report of an Epidemic of Influenza in Chicago During
the Fall of 1918," which is not in Markel's bibliography,
only two actions were taken on day minus-2: The state
banned public funerals and the city issued orders for
teachers to inspect schoolchildren. These actions fall far
short of the authors' metrics. The city's most tangible
action actually did not occur until day plus-19 (21 days
later) which by coincidence was, quoting from the report,
"the day when the epidemic was taking its highest death
toll," ie, at least several days and possibly a week or more
after disease spread had peaked. Only then did Chicago
close "theaters of all kinds, cabarets, dance halls, athletic
meets, and everything of this kind." But even then,
"churches and schools were not closed. Nothing was done
to interfere with the morale of the community."
I did not do a systematic review of all 43 cities covered in
Markel's article. By pure happenstance, I am familiar
enough with events in New York and Chicago to make a
judgment on the quality of his assessment of those two
only, and I do not know how valid his findings are in the
other 41 cities. But his interpretation of data in Chicago
and New York does not inspire faith in the rest of his anal-
ysis. And since, according to Markel, New York was the
earliest city to act and Chicago was tied for third earliest,
one wonders whether, even if everything else in the article
is correct, errors here would be enough to drop the find-
ings below statistical significance.
Is there another explanation for the relatively benign
experiences in New York and Chicago? Possibly. Both cit-
ies experienced quite definite spring waves of influenza,
which may have immunized some of the population.
Finally, it is important to note that the errors in Markel's
article do not disprove the hypothesis that NPIs impacted
the course of the pandemic. But any analysis of their his-
toric use must be based on rigorous scholarship. His is
not.Page 4 of 5
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